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8.1  Introduction 
Since the seminal article by Becker (1974), the economic analysis of 
criminal behavior has focused on the economic incentives to engage in 
illegal actions. These incentives are the integral components of a model 
of the rational  choice to engage in  criminal  acts. According  to this 
model, if the expected rewards from criminal behavior exceed the net 
benefits of alternative pursuits, the individual will choose to engage in 
crime.  Crime is not fundamentally different from legitimate occupa- 
tional pursuits. The expected losses from sanctions-against crime enter 
the criminal choice decision in much the same way as, for example, 
the nonpecuniary aspects of a job would in the choice of employment. 
Consider a theoretical framework in which there are three compo- 
nents to the individual’s choice: the expected financial gains from crime, 
the expected legal sanctions against crime, and the expected  job income 
if the individual chooses not to engage in crime. It should be emphasized 
that the expected values of these three factors are based on the indi- 
vidual’s subjective assessment of the probabilities involved; one need 
not assume that the individual has full knowledge of the true proba- 
bilities  affecting the decision.  For simplicity  let  the time  allocation 
decision be a discrete choice between crime and noncriminal employ- 
ment. Then, the individual will become a criminal if 
gains from 
crime  sanctions  income 
W.  Kip  Viscusi  is professor  of economics,  Northwestern  University,  and  research 
associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
301 302  W.  Kip Viscusi 
which can be rewritten as 
gains from  = EXYGAP > 
crime  income  sanctions 
Using data from the NBER Survey of Inner-City Black Youth, I will 
construct an explicit measure of EXYGAP for each of the respondents 
in the sample based on his assessment of his criminal and legitimate 
earnings prospects. Also included in the analysis will be information 
on whether the respondent believed that crime offers greater rewards 
than employment does. These measures therefore offer the opportunity 
for a very explicit test of the role of economic incentives in determining 
criminal behavior. In that regard, this study is distinctive from all pre- 
vious analyses. 
The focus of the existing empirical literature on crime is quite dif- 
ferent from that in  this study. With  one principal exception, recent 
studies such as Ehrlich (1973, 1975) have focused on aggregative data 
by location, using either a cross-sectional  or a time-series approach. 
Some studies reviewed in Freeman (1983) take the form of  social ex- 
periments, thereby raising additional problems  of interpretation. For 
example, was an ex-offender more responsive to the “supported work” 
experiment than he would have been to market incentives? 
The most  successful  vein  of  research has been on the deterrent 
effect of legal  sanctions.* The legal  sanction variables  in  the aggre- 
gative studies include such measures as the average length of prison 
terms, the arrest rate per crime, the conviction  rate per crime, and 
the imprisonment  rate  per crime for a  particular  city  or  state.  In 
Witte’s  (1980) study of  the criminal  behavior  of  released  prisoners, 
the individual’s frequency of arrests and convictions before his prison 
term  was  used  as the  deterrence  proxy.  Although  many  of  these 
studies have  provoked  considerable  controversy, the overall  thrust 
of their results is that criminal deterrence clearly decreases criminal 
activity. 
A second line of research has been to examine the linkage between 
crime and the labor market, principally  the relationship between un- 
employment and crime. In terms of the criminal incentives discussed 
above, higher  unemployment  rates  should  lower  the expected-job- 
income component of EXYGAP, thus enhancing the attractiveness of 
crime. Diminished job prospects also reduce the opportunity costs of 
incarceration, since the forgone  earnings  will  be less, thereby rein- 
forcing the job-income effect. Although there are many who strongly 
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empirical support for the crime-labor  market linkage. The empirical 
impact of the unemployment variable is typically not as strong as that 
of the deterrence variables. As  Freeman (1983, 106) notes in a recent 
critical  survey of the crime literature,  “The bulk  of the studies ex- 
amined here show some connection between unemployment (and other 
labor market variables) and crime, but they fail to show a well-defined, 
clearly quantifiable linkage.” 
The source of the ambiguity varies according to the type of study. 
Of the ten time-series analyses reviewed by Freeman, nine revealed a 
crime-labor  market  linkage,  but this effect was not as strong as the 
deterrence variable in the three studies that examined both effects. In 
a regression of crime rates on unemployment and a time trend, Freeman 
(1983, 96-98)  found a positive crime-unemployment relationship that 
fell just short of  that required  to pass the usual  tests of  statistical 
significance. A major inherent drawback of these time-series studies is 
the extreme collinearity of the aggregative data. Moreover, even if there 
is an observed effect, one cannot ascertain whether unemployment 
fluctuations influence the level of crime or simply its timing. Individuals 
may simply postpone their criminal pursuits until they have more free 
time during the periods of temporary unemployment. 
The implications of the  15 cross-section  studies also reviewed  by 
Freeman are more mixed. Unemployment and income measures (such 
as the percentage of the population in poverty) had no strong effects 
in the correct direction in more than one-third of the studies, whereas 
the deterrence variables exhibited predictive strength in two-thirds of 
the studies. 
This impression of the weak performance of the labor market vari- 
ables persists in studies of individual data and social experiments. In 
her  study of 641  prisoners released  in  North Carolina,  Witte (1980) 
obtained conflicting results with the wage variable (statistically signif- 
icant effects with differing signs and some insignificant effects) and an 
unexpected negative effect of unemployment on crime. 
Taking these results at face value, one could conclude that the “stick” 
is clearly more effective than  the “carrot”  in  discouraging criminal 
behavior.  Indeed, one might question whether there is any solid evi- 
dence that improved economic opportunities will exert any substantial 
effect on crime. 
Before dismissing the role of the labor market, however, one should 
recognize the imbalance in the research questions posed by these stud- 
ies. In terms of the components of equation (I),  the empirical studies 
have provided a comprehensive analysis of the various legal sanction 
components that contribute to the losses expected from criminal ac- 
tivities. But no study has provided a comprehensive variable pertaining 
to EXYGAP. The most that has been done is to establish proxies for 304  W.  Kip Viscusi 
expected job income (such as the national unemployment rate),3  while 
the expected-crime-income component has been ignored. 
If EXYGAP is subject to random measurement error, the importance 
of the labormarket will be underestimated. In practice, it is likely that 
the error will not be entirely random, since the expected gains from 
crime will also be correlated with the expected-job-income proxy. And 
if opportunities for property crime, for example, decline with increases 
in unemployment, one cannot even be confident that EXYGAP is a 
positive function of  the unemployment rate. 
Rather than dismiss the importance of the labor market on the basis 
of  fragmentary and potentially biased evidence, we should conduct a 
fairer test of the economic motivation hypothesis to assess whether a 
more refined measure of EXYGAP also fails to suggest a significant 
relationship. This test is the primary focus of this paper. 
The nature of the NBER sample makes its data base on crime per- 
tinent to many more issues than simply the professional controversy 
over the significance of EXYGAP or, more generally, the role of eco- 
nomic incentives to commit crime. Youths in the age bracket repre- 
sented in the NBER sample account for well over half of all criminal 
arrests, and minority youths account for a disproportionate  share of 
that amount. The sample consequently permits the analysis of a major 
segment of the urban crime problem. 
In addition, minority youths comprise a particularly distressed seg- 
ment of the labor force, to which their attachment has been notoriously 
A fundamental issue of  social policy is the nature of the activity 
of  youths who are not employed or in  school. Does this group resort 
to criminal activity as a means  of  support?  If  so, we  may  be  less 
concerned with their welfare in terms of their income status, but we 
will be more concerned with the adverse impact of their criminal acts 
on the rest of  society. 
Section 8.2 provides a description of  the sample and the variables 
employed in the analysis, with particular attention to the overall re- 
lationship between criminal activity and the principal variables of in- 
terest.  The  impact  of  the  various  substantive  variables,  such  as 
EXYGAP, on individual decisions to engage in crime is the subject of 
section  8.3. A closely  related  issue, how  the explanatory variables 
influence the total level of crime income an individual receives, is the 
focus of section 8.4. These causal influences differ depending on the 
type of crime. Section 8.5 offers a detailed analysis of the categories 
of criminal activity, their interrelationships, and the role of the causal 
variables in each case. In section 8.6 I consider the behavior of three 
different subsamples of the population: those in school, those who are 
employed, and those who are neither in school nor at a job. The role 
of  economic incentives and the patterns of  criminal behavior will  be 
shown to be quite different across these groups. 305  Market Incentives for Criminal Behavior 
The most important implication of this study is that economic in- 
centives do exert a powerful influence on criminal behavior. Both cur- 
rent employment status and the relative economic rewards from crime 
are instrumental in both the decision to participate in crime and the 
intensity of criminal activity. 
8.2  The Sample and the Variables 
The NBER Survey of Inner-City Black Youth provides detailed in- 
formation on the respondents’ personal characteristics and activities, 
including criminal behavior. The criminal activity questions, which are 
of primary interest here, provide a comprehensive perspective on the 
nature of the youths’ illegal activities, their earnings from crime, and 
their perceptions regarding the attractiveness of criminal pursuits. For 
ease of reference, table 8.1 provides a glossary of the variables used 
in this study. 
The characteristics of the sample are summarized in table 8.2. Means 
and standard deviations are provided for the entire sample of 2,358 
youths and for the two crime subsamples, the 349 individuals (15 per- 
cent) who reported having committed a crime in the past month and 
the 439 youths (19 percent) who reported having committed a crime in 
the past year. 
Through its focus on the criminal behavior of black youths, the NBER 
sample addresses a substantial part of  the overall crime problem, as 
youths 15 to 24  years of  age account for almost 60 percent of all city 
arrests. Givefl this concentration of crime among the young, there must 
necessarily be a drop in criminal activity as one ages. The peak crime 
years for the types of activities surveyed by NBER occur in the 15- 
24  age bracket. Specifically, arrests for robbery, drug law violations, 
and forgery peak between the ages of  17 and 21, while arrests for auto 
theft, burglary, and larceny peak among youths 15 to 16 years 
Within the age span covered by the NBER sample, there is a very 
small relationship between age and crime  The mean age of those who 
had engaged in crime is somewhat higher than those who had not (see 
table 8.2). The year-by-year crime breakdowns in table 8.3 suggest that 
participation  in  crime appears to increase somewhat with age, with 
ages 22 and 24 the peak years. The amount of income earned by those 
who had committed crimes also tends to follow a similar pattern, as 
monthly crime income peaks for those aged 20  and 22  while yearly 
crime income is greatest for those aged 22 and 23. 
These data do not indicate  any age-related  decline  in crime. The 
overall trend  is relatively flat, with some evidence of  an age-related 
increase. This pattern will be borne out by all of  the subsequent sta- 
tistical analysis, as will most of the other patterns in table 8.2. Age 
does not play a major role as an independent, statistically significant 306  W.  Kip Viscusi 
Table 8.1  Glossary of Variables 
















CRIME-  YR 







Age in years 
Years of schooling 
Marital status dummy variable (d.v.); MARRIED =  1 if 
respondent is married, 0 otherwise. 
Drinking d.v.; DRINK =  1 if  respondent ever drinks beer, or 
wine, or hard liquor; 0 otherwise. 
Drug use d.v.; DRUGS  =  1 if respondent ever uses drugs such 
as cocaine, heroin, barbituates, amphetamines, or LSD; 0 
otherwise. 
Marijuana use d.v.; POT =  1 if  respondent currently uses 
marijuana, 0 otherwise. 
Religion d.v.; RELIGION  = 1 if  respondent attends religious 
services at least once a month, 0 otherwise. 
Employed d.v.; JOB  =  1 if  respondent was working most of 
the last week, 0 otherwise. 
School d.v.; SCHOOL =  1 if  respondent was going to school 
most of the last week, 0 otherwise. 
Neither employed nor in school d.v.; NOJOBSCHOOL =  1 if 
respondent was neither employed nor in school most of the 
last week, 0 otherwise. 
Number of months on probation during the time-line period. 
Number of  months in jail during the time-line period. 
Gang membership d.v.; GANG =  I  if  respondent was a 
Crime in neighborhood d.v.; CNBD =  1 if respondent believed 
member of a gang or had friends in a gang, 0 otherwise. 
that crime and violence in the neighborhood was a serious 
problem, 0 otherwise. 
Crime d.v.; CRIME-MO = I if  respondent committed criminal 
acts in the past four weeks. 0 otherwise. 
Crime d.v.; CRIME-YR =  I  if  respondent committed criminal 
acts in the past year, 0 otherwise. 
Expected income gap, namely, (adjusted) expected annualized 
earnings from crime minus expected job income. 
Relative rewards d.v.; YSTREET =  1 if  respondent believes he 
could make more on the street than on a legitimate job, 0 
otherwise. 
opportunities to make money illegally a few times a day. 




Criminal opportunities d.v.; CHANCE1 =  I  if  respondent has 
Criminal opportunities d.v.; CHANCE2 =  1  if  respondent has 
Region d.v.; BOS  =  1 if  respondent lives in Boston, 0 
Region d.v.; CHI  =  1 if  respondent lives in Chicago, 0 
Region d.v.; PHILA =  1  if  respondent lives in Philadelphia, 0 307  Market Incentives for Criminal Behavior 
Table 8.2  NBER Sample Characteristics: Means and Standard Deviations 
within Sample Groups (standard deviations in parentheses) 
Independent 
Variable 
Committed  Committed 
Full  Crime in  Crime in 














Expected Earnings (year) 
Total Income 
Crime-Related Background 
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Table 8.2 (continued) 
Independent 
Variable 
Committed  Committed 
Full  Crime in  Crime in 




CRIME-MU (past month) 
Number of Crimes (past month) 
Crime Income (past month) 
CRIME-YR (past year) 
Number of Crimes (past year) 
Crime Income (past year) 
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oNonresponseswere  setasmissingvaluesandnotusedincalculatingmeans,  that is, 
the sample size differs from that stated. 
"Nonresponses to the expected crime income question were set equal to zero. 
'StandarddeviationsofO-1 dummyvariableswereomittedbecause they could becalcu- 
lated from their fraction rn in the sample, where the standard deviation is (rn -  m*)  0s. 309  Market Incentives for Criminal Behavior 
Table 8.3  Criminal Activity in the NBER  Sample, by  Age 
Average Monthly  Average Yearly 
Age, in  Crime Income ($P  Crime Income ($P 



















































aThe crime income figures are conditional on committing crime in  the particular time 
period. 
”Figures for this age group are not  reliable  because there was only one 15-year-old in 
the sample. 
influence. This result does not imply that age is not an important de- 
terminant of crime, only that age variations within the narrow age range 
of this sample do not play a pivotal role. 
Such a finding is not unprecedented in the crime literature. In a recent 
study of arrests rates that adjusted for a number of factors, such as 
differing sizes of offender populations,  Blumstein  and Cohen (1979) 
reached a similar conclusion. Although their sample of arrestees was 
not a random*sample  from the population, it is not clear a priori how 
their analysis of the criminal histories of these individuals biased the 
age-crime results.  Blumstein and Cohen found  that arrest rates for 
robbery, aggravated assault, larceny, auto theft, and weapons offenses 
exhibited no trends, but that arrest rates for burglary,  narcotics, and 
the residual “all other” offense category actually rose with age. 
The NBER sample results may provide a more accurate picture of 
the age-crime linkage than do the aggregative arrest statistics. More- 
over, the NBER crime  mix  is  quite different  from  that in  the  FBI 
Uniform Crime Reports. The bulk of the reported crimes in the NBER 
sample are for numbers and gambling and for drug sales. Since these 
offenses do not drop off as sharply with age as do, for example, car 
thefts, it is not surprising that the conventional age effects do not hold. 
Two other personal  background  factors, total  years of  schooling 
(EDUC)  and marital status (MARRIED),  also display no substantial 
differences across the entire NBER sample and the crime subsamples 
in table 8.2. The young men surveyed averaged just under an eleventh 
grade education, and few of them were married, irrespective of their 
crime status. The variable EDUC shows little variation across the sam- 
ple, as one would expect in view of legal constraints on schooling. 310  W.  Kip Viscusi 
A series of personal characteristic variables were included as proxies 
for crime-related personal attributes.'j There was a higher concentration 
of crime among those who drank (DRINK)  or who smoked marijuana 
(POT),  but the greatest relative disparity was in the use of more serious 
drugs (DRUGS),  which was about five times as frequent among crim- 
inals as among the entire sample. Church attendance (RELIGION)  also 
was negatively related to illegal activity. 
The incentive to engage in crime depends in part on the individual's 
overall labor market status. An individual can choose to participate in 
crime as his principal pursuit, to augment schooling or a job with crime, 
or to engage in no criminal acts. Labor market status is consequently 
an endogenous part of  the crime decision; but given any particular 
status (such as being in school), that status will also affect the incentives 
to engage in crime. The results show that a respondent who engaged 
in crime was almost as likely to be employed (JOB)  as one who did 
not. Much more variation is displayed based on whether the respondent 
was  in  school  (SCHOOL) or  neither  employed  nor  in  school 
(NOJOBSCHOOL). 
These general relationships suggest that it is school attendance rather 
than  the  level  of  schooling that  is the more  salient  determinant  of 
criminal behavior among young black men. Employment does not ap- 
pear to play a key direct role in reducing crime; it does, however, play 
an indirect role by moving one out of the high crime category of youths 
who were neither employed nor in school. 
It should be emphasized, particularly with respect to the SCHOOL 
variable, that these variables  capture not only the influence of  edu- 
cational  activities  on crime, but  also the fact that respondents who 
chose to attend school had quite distinct personal characteristics that 
were  highly correlated with their  decision to self-select  into the in- 
school group. The subsequent empirical results will therefore overstate 
the likely crime reduction to be obtained by increasing school attendance. 
The labor market earnings for all groups in the sample who responded 
to the wage questions were roughly the same, about $400 per month. 
Since the group of  nonrespondents  (those who did  not  answer the 
questions) included many individuals without a job, this figure over- 
states the average earnings across the entire sample. The total expected 
earnings figure assigns to each respondent his actual wage (calculated 
on an annual basis using hours data). Those without a job were assigned 
their expected wage rate.'  This variable is intended to measure labor 
market opportunities. In general, there is only a minor difference in 
criminal status by the level of  expected market earnings, which were 
about 10 percent less among criminals than among the full sample. 
The total income figure represents actual income from all  sources 
rather than  prospective income. Since many who did not engage in 311  Market Incentives for Criminal Behavior 
crime were in  school, the total income for the full sample was sub- 
stantially below their expected earnings. Respondents who engaged in 
crime had higher overall earnings (crime income plus legitimate earn- 
ings) than noncriminals, with a gap of roughly $1,000, or about one- 
third of the average income of the full sample. The criminals thus were 
not the most impoverished members of the sample but instead appear 
to have been among those who displayed the greatest initiative with 
respect to earning income in a variety of ways. 
The next set of variables in table 8.2 measures factors quite closely 
linked to criminal experience. The probation dummy variable repre- 
sents the fraction in the sample who had been on probation during the 
past year. This group constituted roughly one-fifth of  those who had 
committed crime. Conditional on being on probation during the time- 
line period (13 months), the average probation time was seven months. 
The probation variable  used  in the statistical analysis is the actual 
probation time  (PROBT), which assumes a value of  zero if  the re- 
spondent was not on probation during the period covered by the time 
line. 
The jail variables are defined similarly and are also designed to mea- 
sure the degree of recidivism in the sample. Whereas 3 percent of the 
entire sample had been in jail during the past year, the criminal sub- 
samples contained almost triple this percentage. Among those who had 
been in jail, the average amount of time spent in jail during the time- 
line period was about four months. The jail-time (JAZLT)  variable that 
will be used in the empirical work is the unconditional version of the 
variable, that is, it assumes a value of  zero for respondents who had 
not been in jail. 
The final two crime-related variables may partly reflect the respon- 
dent’s current decision to engage in crime. First, GANG is a dummy 
variable for whether or not the respondent was a gang member or had 
friends in a gang. Those who had committed crime were more than 
twice as likely to meet this criterion as the sample members as a whole. 
GANG is not completely exogenous to the crime decision. An individ- 
ual may associate with gang members or join a gang to enhance his 
criminal opportunities. Any prior commitment to engage in criminal 
acts increased the endogeneity of this variable. 
Second, the degree to which the respondent regarded crime in the 
neighborhood as a serious problem (CNBD)  was also strongly linked to 
criminal behavior. This variable may capture greater criminal oppor- 
tunities and lax criminal enforcement, each of which should boost crime 
rates. It is also possible that those who committed crime blamed their 
acts on the alleged prevalence of crime in their neighborhood. To allow 
for this possibility, the empirical analysis will treat this variable as if it 
were at least partially endogenous, as in the case of the GANG variable. 312  W.  Kip Viscusi 
The variables in the next section of table 8.2 pertain to the degree 
of criminal activity. They play a central role throughout the analysis. 
The first issue, which also serves as the basis for the crime subsample 
stratification, is whether or not the individual engaged in crime. These 
rates are determined on the basis of self-reported criminal activity. The 
respondents were asked whether they had participated in any of ten 
specified criminal activities  (such  as having  ‘‘sold or fenced  stolen 
goods”), one of  which was “any other illegal activities,” The crime 
participation variables (CRIME-MO and CRIME-  YR) have a value of 
one if the individual had participated in any of the types of crime during 
the past month or the past year, respectively. The crime participation 
rates observed were .15 for CRIME-MO and .19 for CRIME-YR. The 
similarity of these figures suggests that crime is a persistent activity of 
a small group of  the sample rather than a random event; if  a random 
event, the past-year crime rate would have been .86. 
A different possibility is that the same individuals who were willing 
to admit to crimes committed in  the past  month were those willing 
to discuss their  criminal activities over the past  year.  Suppose, for 
example, that half of the sample had given a negative response to all 
of the crime questions, regardless of  their actual criminal activities. 
The observed  .15 crime participation  in  the past  month would have 
been  generated if  30  percent  of the group willing to discuss crimes 
had  admitted to the  crimes,  and  the  .I9 annual figure  would  have 
been generated if  38 percent of  that group had  committed crime in 
the past  year. As in the reported data, 79 percent of those who had 
committedicrime in the past month committed crime in the past year. 
A potential bias arises only if  the group unwilling to discuss criminal 
involvement includes a disproportionately different share of persistent 
criminals. 
Ideally, the use of self-reported data should provide a more refined 
measure of criminal behavior than is obtained by using, for example, 
aggregative crime statistics for geographic areas. Particularly in  the 
case of blacks,  however,  there  is a severe underreporting problem. 
Hindelang, Hirschi, and Weis (1981) estimated that the degree of  un- 
derreporting by blacks ranges from a factor of 2 to 4. Rather than only 
one-fifth of the NBER sample participating in crime, the actual amount 
therefore probably ranges from two-fifths to four-fifths. 
This underreporting could potentially create difficulties for the sub- 
sequent empirical analysis. The study by Hindelang, Hirschi, and Weis 
suggests, however, that the behavioral equations for within-group be- 
havior are not distorted; the principal effect of the biased reporting is 
to shift the constant term rather than the  slope in  the regressions.8 
Since the NBER sample includes only black youths, the problems that 
arise in cross-population analyses do not arise here. 313  Market Incentives for Criminal Behavior 
When attempting to assess the overall level of criminal behavior, one 
should nevertheless be cognizant of the likely understatement of crim- 
inal activity. Adjustments other than the factor of 2 to 4 yield similar 
results. Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin (1972) estimated that among their 
sample of nonwhites the rate of juvenile delinquency (namely, police 
contact at some point in one's youth) was 50 percent. If the true crime 
rate for the NBER sample is 50 percent rather than the reported annual 
rate of  19 percent, the reporting bias factor is 2.6, which is just below 
the midpoint of the earlier range. 
A final approach to estimating the actual crime rate of the sample is 
to use information on the frequency of jail terms for those sampled and 
to estimate the number of crimes that are likely to be associated with 
these levels of incarceration. To  do this, I employed information for 
the Washington, D.C. area reported by Blumstein and Cohen (1979), 
particularly the crime categories in their analysis that were most similar 
to the NBER groupings. Each crime committed was estimated to have 
a probability .58 of being reported; if  reported, a .15 chance of leading 
to an arrest; and if  arrested, a .I6 chance of a conviction that leads to 
serving time in jail.9 For every jail term, the number of crimes can be 
roughly estimated as equalling 74. Three percent of the NBER sample, 
or 71 respondents, had done time in jail in the past year, implying that 
the entire sample committed an estimated 5,254 crimes. 
If this estimate is valid, the number of crimes was 2.22 times the 
total sample size. To obtain an estimate of the total number of criminals, 
one must make some assumptions about the degree of repeated criminal 
activity. Each'respondent who had committed a crime in the past month 
participated  in  an average of  1.9 crime categories. If  there were no 
repeated crimes within  a crime category  during the past  month, the 
underreporting factor would be 6. If crimes in each of these categories 
were committed twice monthly, an estimate of the total criminal pop- 
ulation is three times as large as the reported number. This estimate is 
consistent  with  the  earlier  bias  estimates,  but  is  probably  more 
speculative. 
The implications of the reporting bias for the relative role of criminal 
activity is summarized in table 8.4. Based on reported results, crime 
income accounted for 9 percent of the sample's average income. With 
an underreporting factor of 3, which I will adopt as the best estimate, 
crime accounted for 23 percent of the sample's  total income. These 
adjustments take into account only the bias in the frequency of self- 
reported crime. If the amount of criminal income is also understated, 
the role of crime income will be even greater. 
The number of crime categories in which the respondent had com- 
mitted crimes'tends  to be quite low, under two on both the past-month 
and past-year basis. Since the evidence presented in section 8.5 below 314  W.  Kip Viscusi 
Table 8.4  Reporting Bias and the Role of  Crime as an Income Source 
Average  Crime Income as 
Reporting Bias  Average  Total Income  Fraction of 
Factor  Crime Income ($)  ($)  Total Income 
1  252.17  2,837.31  .09 
2  504.34  3,089.48  .I6 
3  756.51  3,341.65  .23 
4  1,008.68  3,593.82  .28 
6  1,5 13.02  4,350.33  .35 
indicates that the respondents were not particularly specialized in their 
criminal pursuits, a likely explanation for this low number is that the 
respondents listed only their major criminal activities. One indication 
that they were selective in their listing is that the list of  activities for 
the past year often did not include all the crime categories in which 
they individually had participated in the past month. 
The two variables governing the relative attractiveness of crime are 
YSTREET and EXYGAP. The YSTREET variable takes on a value of 
one if  the respondent believed that he could make more on the street 
than on a legitimate job, and a value of zero otherwise. This variable 
therefore provides a direct measure of  the relative economic attrac- 
tiveness of crime. Almost half of the criminal subsample had YSTREET 
values of one, whereas just over one-fourth of the full sample had those 
values. As anticipated, those who expected to make more from crime 
were more likely to commit crime. These responses may be biased, 
however, if  those who committed crime were seeking to justify their 
behavior  by  claiming that crime was a more lucrative activity.  lo  As 
discussed in section 8.4 below these responses are nevertheless broadly 
consistent with the respondents’ crime income expectations. 
The variable  EXYGAP is intended  to measure the extent  of  this 
discrepancy between actual and expected income. This variable is con- 
structed by  subtracting expected earnings in  the labor  market from 
expected crime income. The crime income component of the variable 
represents expectations over a week, which were converted to an an- 
nual basis. Criminal pursuits might offer substantial rewards over such 
a short period, since a person could pursue only his most attractive 
options. Crime income over the year will be much lower; and as an- 
ticipated,  the expected  crime  income  amounts exceeded  the  actual 
crime income levels for respondents who had recently engaged in crime. 
For example, those who had committed crime in  the past month had 
an expected weekly crime income of $600 (or yearly income of $3 1,200), 
a figure much lower than their observed yearly crime income under 
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For those who had committed crime in the past  year, actual crime 
earnings exceeded expected earnings for a comparable period by a fac- 
tor of 9.3. To adjust for the likely reduction  in actual criminal oppor- 
tunities over the year as compared with what the respondent might hope 
to reap in a single week, the expected crime income figures were divided 
by 9.3 before subtracting expected annual labor market earnings to ob- 
tain EXYGAP. Even with this adjustment, expected crime income was 
not too dissimilar from expected labor market earnings. The net effect 
was that EXYGAP had a value of  about -  1,900 for the entire sample 
and a much smaller gap for the criminal subsamples, as one might ex- 
pect. Because of this adjustment, YSTREET is a more reliable measure 
than EXYGAP of  the relative economic attractiveness of crime. 
The  economic  incentive  variables  YSTREET  and  EXYGAP  are 
strongly correlated with criminal opportunities. The two opportunity 
variables  I  will  use  pertain  to whether  the respondent  had  several 
opportunities a day to make money illegally (CHANCEl)  and whether 
he had no such opportunities (CHANCE  2).  The intermediate responses 
are not included in these two variables. 
Over half of all respondents had some criminal opportunities. These 
opportunities were  strongly related  to reported  criminal activity, as 
two-fifths of those who had committed crime had several such chances 
a day. Since the opportunities could be generated by the respondent 
himself by, for example, cruising the streets or associating with crim- 
inals, CHANCE1 and CHANCE2 are very endogenous to the criminal 
participation  decision. In the analysis below they  will  be treated  as 
variants of a'crime participation variable. When included as indepen- 
dent variables in the crime equations, CHANCE1 and CHANCE2 play 
a dominant role. 
The final set of  variables  measures the distribution  of the sample 
across the three locations:  Boston (BOS),  Chicago (CHI),  and Phila- 
delphia (PHZLA).  There were stark differences in reported offense rates 
across these cities. In  1981  criminal offenses per  100,000 inhabitants 
were 14,000 in Boston and 6,000 in Chicago and Phi1adelphia.l' Boston 
had a much lower murder rate than the other two cities but a far higher 
rate of property crime, such as auto theft. These differences are not 
apparent in the NBER sample, whose Philadelphia respondents exhib- 
ited the greatest criminal propensity. If  Boston's higher crime rate is 
due to a greater proportion of crimes committed by whites, the overall 
crime statistics may be consistent with the pattern in the sample. 
8.3  The Crime Participation Decision 
An  individual will  choose to engage in  criminal behavior if  the 
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One component of  this calculation is the legal penalties likely to be 
incurred as a result of criminal acts. Although the NBER survey did 
not ask all respondents what they perceived would be the legal sanc- 
tions for their criminal behavior, it did solicit detailed information on 
the perceptions of those who actually engaged in crime. 
The prevailing view of the respondents coincided with the general 
findings of the crime deterrence literature. Quite simply, there is very 
little threat of legal sanctions for crime. Only one of the 320 individuals 
who responded to the enforcement questions viewed the chances of 
arrest, conviction, and going to prison as being high. In contrast, 60 
percent of this subsample viewed each of these possible outcomes as 
being low. 
Table 8.5 summarizes the legal sanction results. Almost three-fourths 
of the sample viewed the chance of  arrest as being low. Conditional 
on being arrested, an even greater proportion viewed the chance of 
conviction as being low. And even if  convicted, few respondents be- 
lieved that there was much chance that they would go to prison. The 
strongest perceived consequence posed by the criminal justice system 
was the conviction-prison relationship, but even this linkage was quite 
weak. 
The implications of legal sanctions for the respondents’ daily lives 
was also not great. The final three columns in table 8.5 present different 
possible events following arrest or conviction, such as losing one’s job. 
These questions were worded to generate hypothetical responses from 
individuals who had no job. The perceived chance of losing one’s job 
was  somewhat higher than  any of  the other risks  in  the table. The 
chance of losing one’s wife or girlfriend if  sent to prison were lower 
than the chance of losing one’s job. By far the lowest risk was that of 
losing one’s friends. Going to prison appears to have a negligible stig- 
matizing effect among the respondents’ peers. 
One would expect the law enforcement perceptions of the noncri- 
minal subsample to be  somewhat greater, since those who perceive 
substantial  risks  will  select themselves into the  noncriminal group. 
Nevertheless, unless there is a strong difference in perceptions, it is 
unlikely that expected legal penalties will be very large. This does not 
mean that law enforcement is irrelevant to the crime participation de- 
cision. Since most values of EXYGAP were close to zero, small vari- 
ations in expected sanctions for crime may alter the decision. 
The focus of this section will be on the determinants of respondents’ 
decisions to commit crime during the past month or the past year. In 
each case, the probability of  participating in  crime is a function of a 
set of explanatory variables. Since the dependent variables are dicho- 
tomous, the equation to be estimated will  not be a linear regression 
but a logit equation estimated by maximum-likelihood techniques. Table 8.5  Perceptions of Law Enforcement 
Conditional Chance 
Perceived  Conditional Chance  of Losing Wife  Conditional Chance 
Enforcement  Chance  Conditional Chance  Conditional  of Losing  or Girlfriend  of Losing Friends 
Level  of Arrest  of Conviction  Chance of Prison  Job If Arrested  If Sent to Prison  If Sent to Prison 
~~___ 
Low  .73  .79 
Medium  .21  .13 
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Each  equation  includes  a set of  personal  characteristics,  crime- 
related background variables, and criminal incentive variables. In ad- 
dition, the equations  are run  both  with  and  without  a  set of  four 
variables that are at least partially endogenous to the crime decision: 
JOB,  SCHOOL, GANG, and  CNBD. The  semi-reduced  form  esti- 
mates that  exclude these intervening  linkages consequently capture 
the full direct and indirect  effects of  the explanatory variables.  In- 
cluding these variables allows an analysis of  the influence of  factors 
such as gang membership; but to the extent that gang membership is 
simply a mechanism by  which the respondent  chooses to engage in 
crime, it will lead to a reduction in the influence of the other variables. 
Table 8.6  summarizes the logistic estimates for the CRZME-MO  equa- 
tions, and table 8.7 provides  the  CRIME-YR results.  What  is  most 
striking about these results is the similarity in the two time periods, 
both in terms of the nature of the effects and their magnitude. 
In each case, the three personal characteristic variables (AGE,  EDUC, 
and MARRZED) had no statistically significant impact. In the case of 
EDUC and MARRZED, this pattern seems attributable to the lack of 
much variability in the sample. Most respondents had the same level 
of schooling and were unmarried. The age range considered may not 
be sufficiently broad to capture the dramatic drop in criminal activity 
during the twenties. 
The next four variables, which measure crime-related characteris- 
tics, all had the expected effects. The most  powerful influence was 
the use of hard  drugs (DRUGS).12  The variable that ranked  next in 
importance was use of  marijuana; the POT variable had roughly half 
the impact on crime as did DRUGS. Next in importance was the use 
of  alcohol (DRINK), which had approximately three-fifths of  the im- 
pact of POT. The least consequential variable was attendance at re- 
ligious services (RELIGION),  which had under half the impact of the 
DRZNK variable. In each case the variable may be capturing not only 
the impact of  the particular background factor but also omitted fac- 
tors correlated with it. 
The probation  time (PROBT)  and jail time (JAZLT) variables both 
have comparable, positive effects on the propensity to commit crime. 
These effects do not imply that legal sanctions have no deterrent effect, 
nor do they necessarily suggest that prison experience leads to further 
crime activity. The high recidivism rate occurs in  part because some 
respondents  were, no doubt, hard-core criminals. The PROBT  and 
JAZLT  variables  may  simply serve as a proxy  for the crime-related 
variables that have not been included in the equation. 
The two city dummy variables CHI and BOS are consistently neg- 
ative, which suggests that the third city, Philadelphia, is more likely to 
generate crime, holding constant the other variables in the equation. 319  Market Incentives for Criminal Behavior 
Table 8.6  Logistic Parameter Estimates for Past-Month Crime Participation 
Equations (asymptotic standard errors in parentheses) 
Independent 
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Table 8.7  Logistic Parameter Estimates for Past-Year Crime Participation 
Equations (asymptotic standard errors in parentheses) 
Independent 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Intercept 
AGE 
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The size of these effects is relatively modest, roughly on the same order 
as that of RELIGION and DRINK. 
The key variables of interest are YSTREET and EXYGAP. Each of 
these economic incentive variables exerts the expected positive effect 
on criminal behavior. The size of the influence is roughly the same in 
all cases, though the past-year  effects are a bit  larger than the past- 
month effects. The inclusion of the four partially endogenous variables 
reduces the role of these economic incentive variables somewhat, in 
part because the crime decision affects such intervening variables as 
the decision to work. In terms of the size of the coefficients, the influ- 
ence of  YSTREET is comparable to that of DRINK, but is much less 
important than, for example, drug use. 
This  comparison is  somewhat misleading,  since  YSTREET  has  a 
mean value of .28, whereas DRUGS has a mean value of .03. A better 
measure of a variable’s contribution to the crime probability is its mean 
value  multiplied  by  the  size  of  the  coefficient.  By  that  measure, 
YSTREET is of greater consequence than DRUGS. The relative  im- 
portance of the other variables changes as well, with  the ranking of 
the impact of the personal  background  factors being,  in  descending 
order of  importance POT, DRINK, RELIGION, and DRUGS. The 
impact of YSTREET lies between that of DRINK and RELIGION. The 
EXYGAP coefficient multiplied by the mean EXYGAP difference be- 
tween the criminal and noncriminal subsamples reflects a much smaller 
impact, in part because of the greater measurement  error associated 
with this variable. 
The differehtial earnings from crime and legitimate occupations are 
a significant, but by no means dominant determinant of criminal be- 
havior. Using the results for CRIME-YR in equation (I), one can cal- 
culate the overall crime propensity, if the expected crime income was 
below the expected labor market income, as being .16. Consequently, 
.03 of the .19 rate of criminal activity is accounted for by  YSTREET. 
Although YSTREET accounts for only one-sixth of crime participation, 
the intensity  of  crime  may  be affected  by  YSTREET as well.  This 
possibility will be explored in section 8.4 below. Another indicator of 
the impact  of  YSTREET on crime is that a  YSTREET value of one 
instead of zero boosts the probability of engaging in crime from .I6  to 
.29, or almost double. Among respondents who believed the economic 
rewards from crime  were greater than those from a job, economic 
incentives played a powerful role in their decision to engage in crime. 
Although relative earnings from legitimate and illegitimate pursuits 
did have a significant effect on criminal behavior, the total level of other 
income  sources (such as welfare  payments and  an allowance from 
family) never had a statistically significant effect in any of the crime 
equations and was therefore not included in the final versions of  the 322  W.  Kip Viscusi 
equations. In this sample it is not poverty per se that drives criminal 
behavior but the relative economic rewards from crime. 
The final set of  variables embodies influences that will capture in 
part the mechanism for the crime participation decision. As one might 
expect, respondents were less likely to engage in crime if  currently 
employed (JOB),  thus reinforcing the earnings influence in YSTREET 
and EXYGAP. The joint influence of  YSTREET and JOB was roughly 
one and one-half times the influence of  YSTREET alone, indicating that 
relative economic incentives had a more powerful effect than did cur- 
rent employment. Educational level did not affect crime, but being in 
school did, since SCHOOL had roughly the same coefficient as JOB. 
At least in terms of the crime participation decision, what matters most 
is whether one is gainfully occupied either in  school or at a job. A 
respondent’s status in one or the other of these two groups was not of 
great consequence. 
Respondents’ peers and criminal environment also played a major 
role.  Gang membership  or having friends in  a gang was  especially 
important. In terms of their effect on criminal propensity, GANG and 
POT had roughly comparable coefficients. The prevalence of a serious 
problem of crime in the neighborhood  (CNBD) had a much  smaller 
coefficient than did GANG; but since neighborhood crime was much 
more common than gang membership, the overall contribution of CNBD 
to observed crime levels was greater. 
8.4  Crime Income 
Since the central economic issue in this discussion is the relation- 
ship between the relative rewards from crime and criminal behavior, a 
fundamental relationship to be investigated  here is the nature of  the 
factors that affect both actual and expected rewards from crime. Total 
crime income is also a fundamental concern, because it reflects both 
the frequency and intensity of criminal behavior. 
The  first  of  these  issues  I  will  consider  is  the  determinants  of 
YSTREET, EXYGAP,  CHANCEl, and  CHANCE2. What  personal 
characteristics are most  likely to lead  an  individual to believe  that 
criminal pursuits are more lucrative than a legitimate job and thus to 
seek out criminal opportunities? The equations reported in table 8.8 
address this issue. 
The two personal characteristics AGE and EDUC should boost ex- 
pected  market earnings, since these are the principal human capital 
variables. AGE increases expected crime earnings by greater amount 
than EDUC does, since the coefficients in the EXYGAP and YSTREET 
equations are always positive. EDUC somewhat surprisingly does not 
have a negative effect on relative criminal and legitimate earnings. The 323  Market Incentives for Criminal Behavior 
Table 8.8  Determinants of  the Economic Incentives to Commit 
Crime (standard errors in parentheses) 
Independent 
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same types of  skills that enhance productivity in a legitimate job may 
reap criminal rewards as well. 
Having been  in jail or on probation  does not  have a consistently 
strong effect, but the crime-related characteristics DRINK, DRUGS, 
and POT do. These variables capture in part the role of personal char- 
acteristics correlated with the particular activity.  Drinking does not 324  W.  Kip Viscusi 
make  a  better criminal  and will  usually  worsen the drinker’s labor 
market prospects. All three activities were positively related to  criminal 
opportunities. The youths who drank or took drugs were generally 
more apt to engage in illegitimate pursuits and more likely to  be exposed 
to illegitimate earnings opportunities. 
The criminal  environment is also of consequence. For YSTREET, 
being a gang member or  knowing people in a gang (GANG)  has a strong 
effect  on the expected criminal earnings.  The existence of a severe 
problem of crime in the neighborhood (CNBD)  also has a significant 
influence for both YSTREET and EXYGAP. 
These criminal  environment  and crime-related background results 
are to be expected. The more surprising finding is that the same vari- 
ables (AGE  and EDUC) that are usually linked most strongly to labor 
market earnings also boost expected criminal earnings by at least the 
same amount. This is not to say that older and better-educated youths 
will, on balance, be more prone to crime. Other variables correlated 
with those human capital variables, such as whether those youths cur- 
rently hold a job, also enter. The net direct effect in the crime partic- 
ipation equations in section 8.3 was not significant, but these variables 
exert a significant positive indirect influence on crime through  YSTREET 
and EXYGAP. 
The most striking difference in the EXYGAP and  YSTREET equa- 
tions is the effect  of the JOB and SCHOOL variables.  These status 
variables have no effect on YSTREET but exert a powerful influence 
on EXYGAP. Respondents who were employed were more likely to 
have positive EXYGAP values, whereas those in  school were more 
likely to have strongly negative EXYGAP values. Although the school- 
ing result is not unexpected, the positive employment effect may reflect 
overoptimistic crime income estimates, particularly in light of the weaker 
JOB effect on YSTREET. 
The  determinants  of  the  frequency  of  criminal  opportunities, 
CHANCE] and CHANCE2,  are not unlike the relative income results. 
What  is  most  striking is that many  of  the effects  are quite  strong. 
Frequent criminal  opportunities (CHANCE])  are strongly  and  posi- 
tively related to DRINK, DRUGS, POT, and CNBD, and negatively 
related to living in Chicago and being in a job or at school. All of these 
variables have the opposite effect for the variable measuring no illegal 
earnings opportunities (CHANCE2).  The performance of the two op- 
portunity  variables gives at least  as strong a  result  in  the expected 
direction as do the crime participation equations. These findings alone 
suggest that criminal opportunities are at least partially endogenous. 
In the final YSTREET equation in table 8.8, CHANCE]  and CHANCE2 
are included to indicate the extent of the interrelationships. The positive 
effect of CHANCE1 and the negative effect of CHANCE2 are dominant 325  Market Incentives for Criminal Behavior 
variables in the equation; the coefficients of these variables dwarf those 
of  all other dummy variables included in  the equation. The criminal 
opportunity variables appear to represent a mixture of the crime par- 
ticipation and relative crime income variables. Although the determi- 
nants of CHANCE1 and CHANCE2 are of interest, these variables do 
not appear as well suited to serve as explanatory variables in a crime 
activity equation. 
The determinants of actual levels of  crime income follow a pattern 
not unlike the determinants of expected income. For the purposes of 
this analysis, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of crime 
income for all respondents in the sample.I3  This variable thus captures 
both the decision to commit crime and the extent of criminal activity. 
This comprehensiveness is a mixed blessing: although it offers a broad 
perspective on crime income, it raises the potential problem of  selec- 
tivity bias.  Since crime income will be received only by  those who 
choose to engage in crime, the equation can be  viewed as suffering 
from specification error, such that the missing variable pertains to the 
sample-selection process governing crime participation. 
To adjust for these problems, I include a selectivity variable (inverse 
Mills ratio) based on a probit estimate of the crime participation equa- 
tion for the past year.I4 The past-month participation equation is not 
used because of convergence problems. The crime participation equa- 
tions, analogous to equation (1)  in tables 8.6 and 8.7, are estimated 
using a weighted nonlinear least-squares probit method. These results 
are then used to construct the distribution function for respondent i’s 
crime participation (CP,), where F(CP,)  is the cumulative distribution 
of a standard normal variable and ACP,) is the corresponding density 
function. The selectivity variable is  -f(CPi)IF(CPi) for those who en- 
gaged in crime andACP,)I[l  - F(CP,)]  for those who did not. 
Table 8.9 presents the regression results for both time periods. The 
regressions including the selectivity variables are equations (4)  and (8). 
The other equations differ according to the inclusion of partially en- 
dogenous variables and the relative crime versus legitimate earnings 
variables. Most of the principal effects are consistent across all of the 
equations. 
The series of crime-related  personal  characteristics  has a positive 
effect on crime income. Respondents who drank, smoked marijuana, 
or took drugs tended to have more crime income, with the effect of 
drugs being particularly  strong. These variables  reflect not only the 
youth’s proclivity toward crime but also his opportunities for crime. 
Those who took drugs were more likely to have the opportunity to sell 
drugs and earn criminal income. Similarly, those who attended religious 
services (RELIGION) were less likely to have criminal contacts and 
may have had the kind of family background that led them to place a Table 8.9  Regression Equations for Natural Logarithm of Crime Income 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Past-Month Income Equations  Past-Year Income Equations 
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higher value on legal sanctions, thus decreasing their proclivity toward 
crime. 
Past criminal  experiences also exert a positive influence on crime 
income. Both time on probation  and time spent in jail over the past 
year are positively related to current crime income. The stronger of 
the two effects is probation time, as each month of probation time has 
roughly double the impact of jail time. These variables are probably 
serving as proxies  for crime-related personal characteristics omitted 
from the equation. 
The two relative crime-versus legitimate income variables have the 
expected positive effect on criminal behavior.  Respondents who ex- 
pected to make more from crime than from a legal pursuit tended to 
have more crime income. These economic incentive effects are a fun- 
damental determinant of crime income levels. A  youth  who viewed 
crime income as more lucrative than job income had an expected crime 
income level $78 larger than the expected monthly crime income amount 
of $26 for the youth who did not believe that crime income was more 
lucrative. On an annual basis, the perception  that crime income was 
more profitable led to a crime income level of  $714, whereas the op- 
posite perception led to a $167 crime income 1e~el.I~ 
In  terms of the mean  effects of  YSTREET, the perception of  the 
economic attractiveness of crime accounted for 26 percent of past- 
month crime income and 34 percent of past-year crime income. These 
effects are roughly twice as large as the influences on the crime par- 
ticipation rate. This differential impact suggests that the economic in- 
centives for criminal behavior affect both the crime participation  de- 
cision and the intensity of criminal behavior, but the larger of these 
two effects is on intensity. 
Since many youths in the sample had minor criminal involvement 
(such as  in numbers and illegal gambling), the crime participation results 
include many crimes that were not as strongly driven by the income 
opportunities they offered. Gambling, for example, may provide sub- 
stantial recreational value. When crime intensity is measured by using 
a crime income variable, the economic incentives to commit crime play 
a more dominant role. 
The partially endogenous variables also continue to be instrumental 
in generating crime income. Being employed and being in school have 
statistically indistinguishable  effects. The size of these coefficients is 
about the same for YSTREET. The contribution of JOB in explaining 
crime  income  is  about the  same as the contribution  of  YSTREET, 
whereas the mean effect of SCHOOL is much greater. The most im- 
portant way that any particular youth can reduce his crime income is 
for him to avoid the crime-prone state of being out of school without 
a job. Gang associations also have a positive impact on criminal be- 329  Market Incentives for Criminal Behavior 
havior, as does the comparatively weaker influence of  crime problems 
in the neighborhood. 
Equation (9) reports the results of exploratory regressions including 
CHANCE1 and CHANCE2. Crime income bears a strongly positive 
relationship  to frequent opportunities to make money illegally and a 
negative relationship to not having such opportunities. These variables 
are dominant in  part because they not only affect the youths’ crime 
decisions but are also influenced by these decisions. Inclusion of these 
variables eliminates roughly half of the impact of  YSTREET because 
of the substantial overlap between YSTREET and the crime opportunity 
variables. For example, only 5 percent of respondents who believed 
they could make more money on the street believed that they had no 
opportunities to make money illegally (CHANCE2).  Since CHANCE1 
and CHANCE2 are highly endogenous to the crime decision, they are 
not included in the subsequent equations. 
Equations (4) and (8) report results including the selectivity variable 
(adjusted for heteroscedasticity).  Because of  convergence problems 
with the past-month crime participation equation, the selectivity vari- 
able included pertains to past-year crime participation.  In each case, 
the effect of the variable on the other coefficients is very modest. The 
principal coefficient of interest,  YSTREET, is unchanged in  the past- 
month income equation and raised by almost 20 percent in the past- 
year income equation. The latter estimate implies that the mean effect 
of  YSTREET accounts for 40 percent of all annual crime income. 
8.5  A Profile of  Criminal Behavior 
The crime participation  variables that have been analyzed thus far 
were based on a series of  survey questions that addressed the nature 
of  the respondents’ criminal involvement. These self-reported mea- 
sures are of interest because they indicate to what extent official sta- 
tistics, such as arrest rates, provide an accurate view of the extent of 
criminal behavior among black youths. Moreover, in conjunction with 
the data on earnings from crime, we can construct measures of  the 
levels of income that arise from different types of  criminal activity. 
Table 8.10 summarizes the pertinent national arrest statistics for 1981. 
The second column lists the distribution of city arrests of youths 15 to 
24 years old. The chief arrest category is larceny-thefts, which accounts 
for two-fifths of all arrests. Drug violations and burglary each account 
for almost one-fifth of all arrests, with the remainder spread over the 
other nine crime categories. 
The third column presents a somewhat different perspective on youth 
crime, indicating the fraction of all city arrests accounted for by arrests 
of  youths aged  15  to 24. For  many  crime categories-larceny-theft, 330  W.  Kip Viscusi 
Table 8.10  National Data on City Arrests for Selected Offenses, 1981 
Offense 
Category 
Fraction of Arrests 
of  15- to 24-Year- 
Olds  In Offense Category 
15- to 24-Year-Olds as 
Fraction of Arrests 





Motor Vehicle Theft 
Fencing Stolen Property 
Fraud 































Source: U.S.  Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of  Investigation, Uniform Crime 
Reports, Crime in the United States (Washington: GPO, 1982). 186-187,  191. 
motor vehicle theft, burglary, robbery, stolen property, and drug vio- 
lations-arrests  of youths in that age range account for well over half 
of all arrests for that particular crime.  Indeed, only in gambling and 
fraud does this age cohort fail to account for at least 44 percent of all 
arrests. 
The extent of crime in  the NBER sample of black  youth  is quite 
different, in large part because of differing rates of arrest across crime 
categories. Tables 8.11 and 8.12 present the distributions for past-month 
and past-year criminal activity. The second columns in the tables list 
the fraction of the entire sample in each category. Since crime was a 
pursuit  of under one-fifth  of the sample, none of these categories  is 
particularly large. Only numbers (and other illegal gambling) is pursued 
by at least 10 percent of the sample. 
More instructive are the third columns of the tables, which give the 
crime distribution conditional upon the individual engaging in criminal 
acts. Once again, numbers and illegal gambling play a dominant role, 
as about two-thirds of all who committed crimes were guilty of  these 
two offenses. Since gambling accounted for only one percent of all city 
arrests of all youths aged 15 to 24 in  1981 (see table 8.10), the arrest 
rate for this activity must be extremely small. 
About a third of the criminal subsample admitted to having been a 
drug dealer (that is, they sold marijuana or other drugs). This activity 
was about equally important on both a monthly and an annual basis. 
Many of the more serious crime categories were of greater consequence Table 8.11  Past-Month Criminal Activity 
Fraction 
of Sample Who 
Behavior Conditional on Crime Activity 
Crime  Committed in  Fraction Who  Average Total  Weighted Average 
Category  in Past Year  Committed Category  Crime Income ($)  Crime Income ($) 
Numbers  .10  .67  187.70  103.01 
Fencing Stolen Goods  .03  .I7  541.82  191.78 
Drug Dealing  .05  .32  412.14  189.42 
Burglary  .01  .05  478.24  134.56 
Mugging  1E-3  .02  365.71  94.61 
Shoplifting  .01  .09  596.67  149.03 
Forgery  1E-3  .02  940.00  120.95 
Con Games  .02  .I6  427.34  133.84 
Robbery  .01  .04  737.69  242.78 
Other  .01  .05  1,110.00  443.51 Table 8.12  Past-Year Criminal Activity 
Fraction 
of Sample Who 
Behavior Conditional on Crime Activity 
Crime  Committed in  Fraction Who  Average Total  Weighted Average 
Category  in Past Year  Committed Category  Crime Income ($)  Crime Income ($) 
Numbers 
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on an annual basis than on a monthly basis.  Burglary (burglary and 
entry, larceny, and auto theft), muggings (and purse snatching),  forgery 
(cashed or forged stolen checks), and robbery (robberies, holdups, and 
stickups) were much more common on an annual basis, which suggests 
that participation in these crime categories is a more occasional activity. 
By a similar token, the share for less-severe crimes was lower on an 
annual basis.  Shoplifting (or stealing from cars and trucks) and  con 
games exhibited the steepest declines. 
The final two columns of tables 8.1  1 and 8.12 report the crime income 
levels associated with each crime category. The information reported 
in the NBER survey was for the youth’s total crime income rather than 
his crime income from each type of criminal  act. The crime income 
figures in the fourth columns are unweighted; each crime category is 
credited with the youth’s total crime income. This measure overstates 
the actual crime income from each form of crime. To  adjust for this 
double-counting problem, the weighted income figures divide all crime 
income from several activities on a proportional  basis (that is, total 
crime income divided by the number of criminal activities), leading to 
much lower crime income levels. 
By far the most lucrative crime category was “other crimes” (namely, 
any other illegal activities), which yielded about $2,000 annually. Youths 
who were reluctant to admit to a specific crime were likely to fall into 
this category. To the extent that these youths committed  more than 
one type of  crime, the figures will  overstate the earnings from  any 
specific class of criminal acts. Nevertheless, since even the unweighted 
crime income figures for the “other crimes” category are higher than 
those for the specific crime categories,  it is likely that many of the 
high-income criminals refused to admit to their specific crimes, despite 
the fact that they did disclose their crime income. 
For the remaining crime categories  the leading sources of income 
varied depending on the time period considered. For the past-month 
data, the five principal income-generating crimes were robbery, fencing 
stolen goods, drug dealing,  shoplifting,  and burglary.  Only  three of 
these categories appeared among the five leading past-year crime in- 
come sources: drug dealing, forgery, burglary, muggings, and fencing 
goods. The most prevalent criminal pursuit, numbers and other illegal 
gambling,  was among the lowest income generators. This activity  is 
popular because it not only is recreational  but also poses a very low 
risk, as there are few gambling arrests among youths. The severity of 
the punishment for gambling is also low. 
Since the respondents generally engaged in several criminal activi- 
ties, one would expect to observe some interdependencies across ac- 
tivities. Youths who engaged in robbery, for example, might also have 
fenced  stolen goods.  For each crime category,  tables 8.13 and  8.14 
present the linkages between the activities within each time period. Table 8.13  Interrelationships Among Past-Month Criminal Activities 
Other Crimes in Which the Respondent Was Involved: 
Crime  Drug 
Category  Numbers  Fencing  Dealing  Burglary  Mugging  Shoplifting  Forgery  Con Games  Robbery  Other 
Numbers  1  .o 
Fencing  .38 
Drug Dealing  .42 
Burglary  .42 
Shoplifting  .36 
Con Games  .46 
Robbery  .27 
Other  .I2 
Mugging  .I2 




























































































'Fewer  than one percent of  respondents. Table 8.14  Interrelationships Among Past-Year Criminal Activities 
Other Crimes in Which the Respondent Was Involved: 
Crime  Drug 
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Respondents who engaged in numbers and other illegal gambling had 
little propensity  toward any other criminal activity, with the possible 
exception of dealing  in  drugs, which  was a pursuit  of roughly  one- 
fourth of this group. Fencing stolen goods had much stronger linkages 
to drug dealing and to complementary crimes, such as mugging, shop- 
lifting, burglary,  and robbery. Drug dealers exhibited a fairly narrow 
crime pattern; they engaged in numbers and illegal gambling but oth- 
erwise did not exhibit high levels of concentration in the other crime 
categories. 
The majority  of burglars  also fenced  stolen goods.  Drug dealing, 
numbers,  muggings,  and  con games  were also frequent pursuits of 
burglars.  Most respondents who reported mugging  were also fences 
and drug dealers. Particularly for the past-year data, shoplifting displays 
strong interdependencies, as at least two-thirds of all shiplifters were 
represented in each of five other crime categories. Those who com- 
mitted forgery were very likely to fence stolen goods or deal in drugs, 
and the majority of those who were involved in con games or  robberies 
also dealt in drugs and played numbers or engaged in illegal gambling 
(past-year data). 
The picture that emerges is one of widespread criminal involvement 
among black  inner-city  youths. The criminal subsample was not en- 
gaged in highly specialized forms of crime. Illegal gambling and drug 
dealing, for example, were highly popular means for augmenting crime 
income from other sources. Rather than specialize in  particular types 
of crime, the modus operandi appears to be that of  taking advantage 
of a diversity of criminal opportunities as they arise. These opportu- 
nities are not random; otherwise the off-diagonal elements in the rows 
in tables 8.13 and 8.14 would be identical. Many of the discrepancies 
that appear in these supplementary criminal activities appear to be due 
to some specialization in terms of the nature of criminal behavior, as, 
for example, fencing stolen goods was very common among those who 
engaged in burglary, shoplifting, and mugging. 
A comparison of criminal activities during the past month and during 
the past year is also feasible using the data on the NBER sample. This 
breakdown, provided in table 8.15, is instructive for two reasons. First, 
it provides a check on the consistency of individual responses. Second, 
it indicates which longer-term criminal pursuits are associated with the 
more continuous pursuits reflected in the past-month data. 
The most extreme example of inconsistency in responses is that ten 
youths  who reported having committed particular  crimes in the past 
month did not admit to any criminal activity in the past month. Since 
seven of  these ten aberrant responses were made  by  youths whose 
crime was playing numbers, this pattern reflects the more questionable 
criminality of minor gambling offenses. Table 8.15  Relationship Between Past-Month and Past-Year Crime Categories 
Conditional Fractions in Past-Year Crime Categories 
Past-Month Crime  Drug  Shop-  No 
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The diagonal elements in table 8.15 reflect the fraction of people in 
each past-month crime category who committed a particular crime in 
the past year. Since the “last four weeks” is included within the “past 
12 months,” presumably these figures should all be 1.0. Nevertheless, 
only one crime category-burglary-meets  this test, and only half of 
the categories have at least 90 percent overlap. In the most extreme 
case, shoplifting, only 19 percent of those who admitted to this crime 
during the past month admitted  to it in  the past  year. One possible 
explanation for these discrepancies is that respondents may have re- 
ported only their principal criminal activities during the time period in 
question. 
In some cases, there are no strong interdependencies. Youths who 
played numbers or gambled illegally in the past month had no strong 
criminal tendencies during the past year. The majority of fences were 
also drug dealers, but the reverse was not true; drug dealers mostly 
engaged in numbers and gambling. Fencing stolen goods was also a 
dominant  pursuit  of  those  who  engaged in  burglary,  shoplifting,  or 
forgery in the past year. Among the strongest cross-crime linkages were 
that 90 percent of all who shoplifted in the past month participated in 
muggings in the past year and that 86 percent of  all forgers were in- 
volved in con games in the past year, while a comparable percentage 
of those who were involved in con games also committed robberies in 
the past year. 
The last line of table 8.15 lists all the respondents’ who reported 
having committed no crimes in the past month. Ninety-five percent of 
this group committed no crime in the past year. The three crime cat- 
egories over which the remaining 5 percent were distributed were num- 
bers, drug dealing, and “other crimes.” These categories tend to rep- 
resent  less  violent  crimes than  those  of  robbery  and  mugging, for 
example.  In addition, there are not as many strong criminal interde- 
pendencies for these categories as there are for the other crime groups. 
There  consequently appear to be  three principal groups.  First, a 
majority of the sample reported no criminal activity. Second, there is 
a small criminal element involved in comparatively nonviolent crimes, 
such as drug dealing and numbers, on a periodic basis.  Finally, most 
youth crime stems from a hard-core criminal group for whom crime is 
a persistent activity. 
Because of  the small sample size of many of  the crime categories, 
it was not possible to perform a comprehensive statistical analysis of 
the determinants of  all criminal pursuits.  It is feasible, however, to 
present an analysis of the larger crime categories. Table 8.16 displays 
the logit results for four crime participation equations. Variables that 
played an insignificant role16 in the preliminary analysis were omitted 
to ensure convergence in the maximum-likelihood procedure. 339  Market Incentives for Criminal Behavior 
Table 8.16  Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Determinants of 
Participation in Crime Categories 
(asymptotic standard errors in parentheses) 
Numbers  Numbers  Drug 
Independent  Games  Games  Fencing  Dealing 
Variable  (Year)  (Month)  (Year)  (Year) 
Intercept  -  2.658  -  2.904  -  1.239  -4.327 
(.176)  (.190)  (1.01)  (.275) 
-  -  -  ,207  -  AGE 
DRINK  ,701  .599  ,558  - 
DRUGS  1.063  ,800  2.368  2.308 
(.055) 
(. 175)  (.I881  (.361) 
(.261)  (.272)  (.315)  (.274) 
(.150)  (. 163)  (.327)  (.254) 
RELIGION  -  ,396  -  ,341  -  -.318 
(.163)  (. 174)  (.230) 
PROBT  ,010  ,001  -  ,009 
(.002)  (.002)  (.003) 
-  ,333  CHI  -  .440  -  ,325 
(. 163)  (. 173)  (.237) 
BOS  -  .958  -  ,894  - 
YS  TREET  .570  ,607  ,456  ,902 
POT  .769  ,848  1.645  2.223 
- 
-  ,491 
(. 174)  (.184)  (.217) 
(.144)  (.153)  (.251)  (.188) 
-  2 Log Likelihood  1,486.87  1,339.00  565.94  856.69 
The estimates for the two equations for participation  in  numbers 
games are quite similar. The variables DRINK, DRUGS, and POT all 
have the expected positive effect on participation in this crime. What 
is most striking is  that the coefficients are all of  similar  magnitude, 
unlike the overall crime results. For such a minor and prevalent offense, 
the nature of one’s crime-related personal characteristics does not play 
a major role. The positive impact of the economic incentives variable 
YSTREET is comparable to that in the aggregative crime equations. 
The more serious crimes of fencing stolen goods and dealing in drugs 
are much more strongly linked to DRUGS and POT. The role of eco- 
nomic incentives appears to be particularly great in the case of drug 
dealing, where the YSTREET coefficient is about 50 percent larger than 
in most of the earlier results. This finding is consistent with the crime 
income results, which suggests that YSTREET is a more powerful de- 
terminant of intense criminal activity than of crime participation, such 
as numbers. 340  W.  Kip Viscusi 
8.6  Behavior Conditional on Status 
The findings for crime participation and crime income suggested that 
being in school or holding a job discouraged  criminal behavior with 
roughly similar effects. The primary distinction was whether the re- 
spondent was in the relatively idle NOJOBSCHOOL state. Although 
the possibility that respondents’ status shifted the intercept of the crime 
equations was considered, the nature of  behavior as reflected in the 
coefficients may change as well. In this section I will address these 
differences in behavior in greater detail. 
Table 8.17 summarizes the source of  income and degree of crime 
participation conditional on the respondents’ status. Those with a job 
had the highest annual earnings, over $5,000. Nevertheless, about a 
fifth of those who were employed also committed crime, but the mag- 
nitude of criminal earnings had little effect on the average income of 
those who worked. Because of the very large variance in crime income, 
however, some employed respondents obviously realized a substantial 
income supplement from crime. Those in school had very low labor 
market earnings or illegitimate earnings, and only one-eighth of this 
group participated in crime during the past year. Among those not then 
employed or in  school, annual income was equally divided between 
crime income and job earnings. Approximately half of this group par- 
ticipated in crime during the past year. 
Tables 8.18 and 8.19 present the CRIME-MO and CRIME-YR logit 
equation estimates. Because of the thinness of  the subsamples, some 
variables .were omitted  from the equations because  of  convergence 
problems. For example, since only eight of  the in-school population 
took drugs, the DRUGS coefficient could not  be  estimated for this 
subsample. The greatest difference from the previous findings is the 
performance of  YSTREET. Both in terms of the magnitude of the coef- 
Table 8.17  Means of Income Sources, by Status 
(standard deviations in parentheses) 
Annual  CRIME-  YR 
Annual  Crime 
Status  Earnings ($)  Income ($) 
JOB  5,328.89  177.45  .18 
(4,350.33)  (I ,163.64)  - 
SCHOOL  609.88  79.49  .I2 
(1,497.31)  (563.09)  - 
NOJOBSCHOOL  487.03  505.35  .51 
(2,002.66)  (2,341.14)  - 
*Standard deviations of  0-1  dummy variables were omitted because they could be cal- 
culated from their fraction m in the sample, where the standard deviation is (m -  m2)o.s. 341  Market Incentives for Criminal Behavior 
ficient and its statistical significance, YSTREET plays no apparent role 
for those in the JOB or SCHOOL states. The behavior of  these groups 
is driven by variables such as DRINK, DRUGS, POT, and GANG (for 
the in-school group). 
These variables are of consequence for the NOJOBSCHOOL pop- 
ulation as well. But here YSTREET plays a much more powerful role, 
with effects up to twice as large as those estimated previously. The 
thinness of the criminal population among the JOB and SCHOOL groups 
should lead one to be cautious in drawing conclusions from these re- 
Table 8.18  CRIME-MO Logistic Parameter Estimates, by  Status 
(asymptotic standard errors in parentheses) 
Independent 
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Table 8.19  CRIME-YR  Logistic Parameter Estimates, by  Status 
(asymptotic standard errors in parentheses) 
Independent 
Variable  JOB  SCHOOL  NOJOBSCHOOL 
Intercept 
AGE 
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sults. Nevertheless, the relative importance of economic incentives for 
criminal behavior is clearly greater for those in the NOJOBSCHOOL 
state. 
This result is what one should expect. Those working at a job have 
less of an economic motivation to commit crime, since they have their 
labor market income. Moreover, the decision to accept a job reflects 
their greater satisfaction with the level of  wages offered in the market 
than that of youths who have no job. Similarly, youths in school tend 
to be supported by their parents. It is the out-of-school group without 343  Market Incentives for Criminal Behavior 
gainful employment who have the greatest economic incentive to en- 
gage in criminal acts. 
8.7  Conclusion: Crime as an Alternative Income Source 
Youth crime has been the subject of a number of analyses because 
of its central role in the overall crime problem. For the black youths 
in the NBER sample, crime serves an economic function by providing 
many with a substantial income source. After adjusting for the likely 
underreporting  of crime, I estimate that roughly one-fourth of all in- 
come of those in the sample was from criminal pursuits. 
The black  youth crime problem is, however, not pervasive among 
the entire demographic group. Roughly one-fifth of the sample reported 
criminal activity, but up to three-fifths of the sample may have engaged 
in crime (after adjusting for self-reporting bias). Those who reported 
criminal  activity  were a fairly hard-core criminal  group. There was 
very  little  entry into and exit  from  this  criminal  population,  which 
remained quite stable over the year. Those engaged in crime undertook 
multiple criminal activities, some of  which were related (for example, 
mugging and burglary), but there also seemed to be an opportunistic 
effort to take advantage of various criminal activities as they arose. 
Those predisposed toward crime also possessed characteristics not 
conducive to success in legitimate forms of work, and they had greater 
contact with criminal  opportunities. Drinking, drug use, gang mem- 
bership, past criminal activity (as indicated by probation or  jail time), 
and problems4of crime in the neighborhood all were strongly correlated 
with criminal behavior. In short, the types of youths who commit crime 
differ quite starkly and systematically from those who do not. 
A fundamental influence on criminal behavior is the role of economic 
factors, such as labor market status. Respondents who were in school 
or employed were much less likely to engage in crime. What was most 
important was being out of the NOJOBSCHOOL category rather than 
being in the JOB or  SCHOOL group. Although the respondent’s status 
reflects  in part an endogenous decision to allocate time  to criminal 
behavior, the criminal  behavior of these groups was quite different. 
Respondents who were not employed or in school were much more 
strongly driven by the economic incentives to commit crime. 
The role of economic incentives to commit crime received particu- 
larly strong support in the NOJOBSCHOOL group  and was statistically 
significant overall. If youths can make more money from crime than 
from labor market earnings, they will be more likely to engage in crime. 
Although these effects were statistically significant, making the gains 
from employment larger than the gains from crime would directly elim- 
inate only one-sixth of the crime participation by black youths. 344  W.  Kip Viscusi 
Economic  incentives  are  more  consequential  for  higher-income 
crimes, such as drug dealing, than for minor crimes, such as numbers. 
When  one takes into account the intensity  of  criminal behavior,  as 
measured by crime income, the comparative economic rewards for 
crime account for one-third of all crime. This impact is roughly double 
the influence on crime participation.  Even this amount probably  un- 
derstates the potential long-term effectiveness of economic incentives 
because of a stabilizing effect of employment. Including the effect of 
having a job roughly doubles the impact of the labor market; the labor 
market variables may therefore account for as much as two-thirds of 
all crime income. Economic incentives are instrumental  for a relatively 
small portion of the criminal population, but this segment accounts for 
a disproportionate share of all crime income. 
In terms of the relative efficacy of the “carrot”  of improved eco- 
nomic opportunities and the “stick” of stricter criminal enforcement, 
there is strong evidence that the “carrot” is more effective. The mag- 
nitude of  this influence is not so dominant, however, that society should 
abandon its criminal enforcement efforts.  On the other hand, this is 
not to say that improved economic opportunities are unimportant. The 
fringe crime group is particularly  likely to be affected by  more em- 
ployment opportunities. Although minor changes in the economic en- 
vironment may not dramatically alter the overall youth crime problem, 
the criminality among those who are not in school or  employed is very 
sensitive  to economic incentives. Since members of  this group are 
responsible for most of youth crime, they comprise a major, econom- 
ically responsive component of the criminal population. 
Notes 
1.  More rigorously, the expected utility from crime must exceed the expected utility 
from legitimate activities. In the case of  risk-neutral criminals, expected rewards and 
expected utility are equivalent. In addition to the early articles by Becker (1974). Ehrlich 
(1973, 1975). and Block  and Heineke (1975), see the survey by  Heineke (1978) of the 
theoretical literature on crime. The job-risk counterpart to this problem is the focus of 
the analysis in Viscusi (1979). 
2. Among the many surveys  that review this literature are those by Cook (1977, 1980). 
Taylor (1978), and Wilson and Boland (1976). See Freeman (1983) for a comparison of 
the deterrence and unemployment literatures. 
3.  Witte’s (1980) study uses the wage received on the first job as the income measure, 
but even this is not an ideal index of a person’s present opportunities. 
4. The recent conference volume edited by Freemen and Wise (1982) addresses these 
issues in great depth. 
5.  These age-related trends are discussed in Greenberg (forthcoming). 
6.  Two background  variables that might  be expected to be linked to crime-being 
registered to vote and income other than from earnings (such as from food stamps)- 345  Market Incentives for Criminal Behavior 
never had a significant influence on criminal behavior and are not included in the results 
reported here. 
7.  Respondents who had no job and who had no expected wage were assigned a wage 
value equal to the mean expected wage of those who were not employed. 
8. See,  in particular, the authors’  discussion on  pages 173-76 and 2 13. They concluded, 
“We  did learn from the data supporting the optimistic conclusion that  the self-report 
method can produce reliable and valid results within the population to which it is generally 
applied” (p. 213). 
9. The crime categories for these calculations were as follows: reporting rate (burglary, 
larceny, and auto  theft); conditional arrest rate (robbery, burglary,  larceny, and auto 
theft); and conditional rates of serving time in jail (robbery, burglary, larceny, auto theft, 
narcotics, and others). The variation in the crime categories is the result of both differ- 
ences in data availability and the unreliability of  some data. For example. arrest rates 
for narcotics violations were very high because these violations usually go unreported, 
except when discovered by the police. 
10.  1 am indebted to James Q. Wilson for this observation. 
1 I. These numbers were derived from population figures and offense reports given in 
U.S. Department of Justice (1982, 39, 68, 75 and 98). 
12.  This result is not unexpected. See Moore (1983) for a discussion of the importance 
of drug use and related “criminogenic”  traits. 
13.  Since some individuals had no crime income, the zero values had to be coded in 
a manner that would permit the use of natural  logarithms. For purposes of estimation 
the natural logarithm of zero was set equal to  -6.9. 
14.  More specifically, I  used the weighted  nonlinear least-squares program supplied 
to  me  by  Gregory M. Duncan.  For an excellent discussion of the sample-selectivity 
correction, see Duncan (1981). A recent application of this correction to labor economics 
issues appears in Duncan and Leigh (1980). 
IS. These estimates were obtained using equations (I) and (5)  in table 8.9. 
16.  No variables  with  t-statistics above 1.0 in  the OLS counterpart of  these logit 
equations were dropped. Most excluded variables had t-statistics on the order of 0.  I. 
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Comment  James W.  Thompson and James Cataldo 
In this paper, one of the first individual-level employment and crime 
analyses of a sample not drawn from an offender population, Viscusi 
concludes that “roughly one-fourth of all income of those in the sample 
was from criminal pursuits.”  If  this finding can be  upheld  (and we 
believe that it is generally correct), then it carries far-reaching impli- 
cations for future research on the inner-city youth labor market. At 
last we can replace armchair speculations from aggregate data on eco- 
nomic incentives and crime deterrence with close examination of the 
full spectrum of  income generation, ranging from legitimate employ- 
ment in well-established firms to off-the-books and underground eco- 
nomic activities, and from these to street crimes such as muggings, 
burglaries, and drug selling. If Viscusi’s work succeeds in establishing 
a  commitment  to  this  broader  focus,  his  contribution  will  remain 
important. 
But accepting that crime occupies an important place in the income- 
generating activities of  inner-city  youths does not  automatically  ad- 
vance our understanding of the problem. Here, Viscusi’s example is 
instructive, sometimes for its success in addressing thorny issues, and 
sometimes for its failures. The strength of  Viscusi’s approach is that 
he has developed a clear conception of the nature of economic incen- 
tives to engage in crime, namely, the difference between  illegal and 
legal earnings expectations (EXYGAP and YSTREET);  and he has ad- 
hered to this conception in estimating the determinants of crime par- 
ticipation and of crime income levels. The flaws in his analysis arise 
in his implementation, and they include the manner in which he spec- 
ifies EXYGAP and his exclusive use of self-reported measures of crime 
participation. 
EXYGAP and Relative Earnings from Work and Crime 
In his model of  employment and crime, Viscusi claims to adopt a 
framework of  “discrete  choice between  crime and noncriminal  em- 
ployment.” Such a model, though possible, is at variance with Viscusi’s 
own data showing that 24 percent of  youths (aged 16  to 24) admitting 
to crime in the past month also held jobs. Indeed, employment and 
crime studies have typically found a large amount of concurrent crime 
and  employment.  For  example,  the  Vera  Institute’s  survey  of  902 
Brooklyn male arrestees in the summer of  1979 found that roughly 40 
percent of the young (aged  16 to 24) blacks in the sample also held 
James W.  Thompson and James Cataldo are, respectively, director and research as- 
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jobs. This evident mixing of legal with illegal sources of income is also 
implicitly  acknowledged  by  Viscusi  when  he  develops  his  logistic 
regressions.  In some of these, JOB and SCHOOL are introduced as 
explanatory variables into equations that have crime participation as a 
dependent variable. This procedure would be meaningless if a “discrete 
choice between crime and noncriminal  employment” were in fact at 
issue. If crime and work are alternative activities, then the introduction 
of one as an independent variable would be equivalent to introducing 
the logical complement  of the dependent variable as an explanatory 
variable. 
On the other hand, if  the choice framework is not binary, it would 
appear that the variables  EXYGAP and  YSTREET are not  entirely 
appropriate for modeling crime participation, since they measure total 
potential income rather than differences in earnings at the margin. For 
example, a working youth is likely to encounter at least a few oppor- 
tunities for crime that offer marginal returns much higher than those 
from legitimate work. Nevertheless, such a youth’s total potential in- 
come from work would likely be much greater than his total income 
obtainable from crime, since, as Viscusi observes, the quality of his 
criminal opportunities  would deteriorate rapidly as he began to ‘‘use 
up” his best crime options. Even so, some youths would be expected 
to continue to engage in  those occasional  criminal  activities  whose 
marginal returns equalled or exceeded their wage rates. 
Adding to the difficulty associated with the binary choice framework 
are other perplexities associated with the key variable EXYGAP itself. 
EXYGAP is the difference between expected illegal and expected legal 
earnings. It thus has two distinct components, and problems are in- 
herent in each one. 
First consider expected illegal income. A point that Viscusi too little 
emphasizes is that expected illegal earnings are extraordinarily high; 
they are $22,945 on an annualized basis for the sample as a whole and 
they rise to $31,200 for those respondents who reported crime during 
the past month. Such levels are hardly comparable to either expected 
legal earnings ($3,800  for the crime-committing subgroup), nor are they 
at all comparable to actual annual crime income ($1,570). 
What is going on here? Viscusi suggests, as we already noted, that 
expectations of illegal income opportunities are overly influenced by a 
few relatively good opportunities close at hand and by the fact that the 
youths do not adequately discount their longer-term crime prospects 
once these short-term options are used up. This phenomenon is familiar 
to anyone who has tried to sell scout cookies by working outward from 
his or her immediate family, but one that sharply distinguishes income- 
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How expectations about crime income are formed and what factors 
determine them are at the heart of the crime decision. Viscusi implicitly 
assumes that everyone exaggerates  crime opportunities in  the same 
way, and in fact he develops a single discount factor (9.3)  by comparing 
offenders’ expected (annualized) crime returns to their actual crime 
income. But the extent to which  youths anchor their crime income 
potential on their best opportunities  implies that the tendency to ex- 
aggerate would  decline with greater levels of participation  in crime. 
Those who commit no or only a few crimes would be more prone to 
extrapolate from  a  few good  opportunities  not  yet  explored, while 
experienced offenders  would be more likely  to make realistic,  long- 
term appraisals. This hypothesis might be tested by comparing different 
discount factors, such as between those with low and high actual crime 
incomes or among different  subgroups defined  in  terms of  age and 
school and job status. 
Next consider legal earnings expectations. Just as it is likely that 
illegal income expectations depend partly on the level of crime expe- 
rience,  it is plausible to suppose that legal income expectations also 
derive from experience in the labor market. But in a sample of inner- 
city youths, such experience is very unevenly distributed. In the NBER 
sample, only about a quarter (26 percent) were at work, two-fifths were 
in school, and a third (34 percent) were neither at work nor in school. 
These groups surely form expectations of legal earnings in very dif- 
ferent ways. Those in jobs may have realistic (lower?) expectations 
concerning  legal income prospects, since they are already in the market; 
those in  school, by  contrast, have less direct knowledge about pre- 
vailing legal opportunities, and their expectations may be largely based 
on their current self-investment activities; and finally, those neither in 
jobs nor in  school may  well  have the lowest  expectations. As with 
illegal income, Viscusi once again combines actual and expected earn- 
ings, using the former for those in jobs and the latter for the remainder. 
Such blending of actual with expected legal income, combined with 
the previously  described assumptions underlying  the discounting  of 
expected illegal  gains,  makes EXYGAP an odd hybrid  with  hidden 
complexity, rather than the seemingly simple motor driving crime de- 
cision making that is initially introduced in the paper. There is in fact 
still one more source of difficulty: The likely dependence of legal and 
illegal income expectations on the individual’s level of participation in 
these activities raises the same issue of endogeneity that Viscusi notes 
with respect to several other variables in the study-chances  to engage 
in crime, gang affiliation, and perceived  crime in  the neighborhood. 
Clearly, the path of future research should be to develop additional 
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longitudinal designs  that  are capable  of  unraveling  complex  causal 
relationships. 
Self-reports and the Prevalence of  Criminal Activity 
It is from exclusive reliance upon self-reported measures that a sec- 
ond set of  difficulties arises. Although Viscusi at various places dis- 
cusses problems  with the  self-reported  measure of  criminal activity 
(and, indeed, ultimately concludes that there was three times as much 
crime in the sample as sample members themselves reported), he is 
insufficiently cautious in approaching several pieces  of  internal evi- 
dence that cast doubt on the measure: the surprising lack of  an age- 
crime association, the apparently skewed distribution of types of crimes 
in the sample, and the nearly complete absence of movement between 
crime and noncrime states. 
In table 8.3 Viscusi finds no association between age and the prev- 
alence of self-reported crime. He correctly observes that the truncated 
age distribution in his sample (16 to 24 years) would lessen the otherwise 
very sharp dropout effects that would appear with broader age group- 
ings; but his argument that the failure to see any of  this pattern is a 
result of the virtual absence of muggings, burglaries, and robberies in 
the self-reports of his sample (crimes that show especially sharp de- 
clines with age) begs the question. Only be accepting the veracity of 
the  self-reports can  we  believe  that  these street crimes (which are 
particularly prevalent among younger inhabitants of inner-city minority 
neighborhoods) are absent from his sample. If they were present, we 
would expect an age-related decline in  crime even in the age range 
from 16 to 24 years. The absence of this decline suggests that members 
of one subgroup, active in relatively violent and risky crimes, are not 
talking about their activities.  * 
Viscusi  cites a study by  Blumstein and  Cohen  (1979) to  suggest 
that this  lack of  an age-crime pattern  is  “not  unprecedented.”  But 
the  Blumstein-Cohen  study addressed  an  entirely  different facet  of 
the age-crime relationship:  the intensity of criminal activity among a 
subgroup of  active  offenders,  rather  than  rates  of  participation  in 
crime at different ages. 
The Blumstein-Cohen study found that the intensity of illegal activity 
among people still active in their criminal careers did not vary signif- 
icantly by age; the well-established sharp decline in aggregate arrests 
per capita among older age groups in the general population therefore 
results from the fact that some people “drop out” from crime, rather 
than from a smooth tapering off of criminal activity as active offenders 
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More concern over the failure to find an expected age-crime asso- 
ciation or self-reports of crimes such as muggings and burglaries might 
have led to more caution concerning a third issue, the near absence of 
an increase in crime in the sample between the past-month  and past- 
year time periods. The fact that self-reported crime rose only from 15 
to 19  percent of the sample between these two periods leads Viscusi 
to infer, as he puts it in his concluding section, “Those who reported 
criminal  activity  were a fairly  hard-core  criminal  group. There was 
very little  entry into and  exit from this  criminal  population,  which 
remained quite stable over the year.” 
This image of a “hard core” group hardly jibes with Viscusi’s own 
acceptance of  an underreporting  factor of  3  (which  implies  that 57 
percent of his sample engaged in crime over the past year), or with the 
close similarity  in  employment rates between the entire sample (26 
percent) and those who admitted to crime (24 to 25 percent). If it is a 
hard-core criminal group, it is at least an employed hard-core group. 
Although self-reported measures are valuable in this type of study, 
they should be complemented with official arrest data. If this is not 
possible, one should refrain from poorly supported conjectures about 
a “hard core” of criminal youth. The best current estimate, developed 
by  Blumstein and Grady from a combined  study of longitudinal and 
cross-sectional  data, is that black men living in large (not “inner”) U.S. 
cities experience a cumulative lifetime probability of one or  morefelony 
arrests of 51 percent, whereas white men  in the same cities have a 
cumulative probability of 14 percent.2 Most of this arrest risk occurs 
by  the middle  twenties. This estimate is one of many indications of 
widespread crime among poor, minority youths, and it further suggests 
that in some “high  risk”  inner-city (as against large-city) areas, par- 
ticipation in crime for income gains is a predominant  pattern, not at 
all confined to a hard-core group. 
Only if  others follow the lead of the NBER study, and only if  we 
overcome the  sterile  isolation  of  crime  research from  the study of 
broader labor market phenomena, will we be able to come to grips with 
the full implications of the fact that income-generating street crime is 
both widespread within poor populations and, within the individual life 
cycle, relatively short-lived. 
Notes 
1.  Bias might also have arisen in other, indirect ways. For example, perhaps inter- 
viewers concerned about their own safety selected meeting times and places or types 
of respondents that led to the relative exclusion of this group. The study methodology 
is not described, a serious problem in studies such as this of hard-to-reach populations. 
2.  Alfred Blumstein and Elizabeth Grady, “Prevalence and Recidivism in  Index Ar- 
rests: A Feedback Model,”  Law and Society Review  16, no. 2 (1981-82). 